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CONTAGION EQUILIBRIA IN A MONETARY MODEL 
BY CHARALAMBOS D. ALIPRANTIS, GABRIELE CAMERA, 
AND DANIELA PUZZELLO' 
KEYWORDS: Money, matching, infinite games, social norms. 
THE MODEL OF LAGOS AND WRIGHT (2005) alters the meeting friction of the 
typical search model of money to obtain degeneracy in equilibrium holdings 
and enhance analytical tractability. It introduces a round of Walrasian "cen- 
tralized" trading after each round of bilateral random "decentralized" trading. 
The basic premise is that, although the population meets repeatedly in the 
centralized market, anonymity and random pairings are frictions sufficient for 
money to be essential (see Lagos and Wright (2005, p. 466) or Rocheteau and 
Wright (2005, p. 175); for the essentiality, see Huggett and Krasa (1996) and 
Kocherlakota (1998)). 
This note, based on Aliprantis, Camera, and Puzzello (2005) (where details 
and proofs can be found), clarifies that anonymity and random pairings are not 
per se sufficient togenerate an essential role for money. Further frictions are 
generally needed. The starting point is the work of Ellison (1994) and Kandori 
(1992), who proved that efficient outcomes are supported by "contagion equi- 
libria" in repeated anonymous matching ames. We cast the model in Lagos 
and Wright (2005) as an infinitely repeated game with observable individual 
actions2 and we show the existence of contagion equilibria if agents are suffi- 
ciently patient. This, however, is not robust o adding a small amount of noise 
in the observation of individual behavior, because equilibria would arise sim- 
ilar to those in the continuum limit where individual behavior is unobserv- 
able (Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky (2001), Fudenberg, Levine, and Pesendorfer 
(1998), Levine and Pesendorfer (1995)). 
The argument goes as follows. There is a unique efficient allocation that 
is sustained by "desirable" behavior. So, consider a social norm that specifies 
autarky forever as the sanction rule if a defection from desirable behavior is 
observed. Centralized trading fosters the rapid spread of sanctions and so dis- 
courages defections in all anonymous matches. Intuitively, the random match- 
ing friction in the typical search model fragments the process of exchange of 
goods and of information, but introducing centralized trading allows an infor- 
mal enforcement scheme to emerge. Consequently, money ceases to be essen- 
tial for the process of exchange. In fact, eliminating money improves efficiency. 
'This research was supported in part by NSF Grants SES-01-28039 and DMS-04-37210. We 
thank a co-editor and three anonymous referees for several helpful comments. 
2The model in Lagos and Wright (2005) assumes a continuum of agents. Here we suppose that 
agents are countable to highlight the fact that individual actions are observable. 
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1. THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
Time is discrete and infinite, indexed by t = 0, 1, .... There is a constant pop- 
ulation J = N of identical infinitely lived agents and a single perishable good 
that can be produced by a fraction of the population at each date. In each t a 
matching process, as specified in Aliprantis, Camera, and Puzzello (2006) par- 
titions J into spatially separated trading roups G,(j) for j E J. Assume that 
Go(j) = {j} and, in all t > 1, let Gt(j) = 1j, p,(j)} if t is odd and let G,(j) = J if t is even, where 8t3(j) , j with probability a for each j e J. Thus, trading in odd 
periods is decentralized (agents are paired with probability a), while in even 
periods it is centralized (everyone is in an economy-wide group). Agents can 
only trade and observe actions and outcomes in their match, and are anony- 
mous as in Ellison (1994), i.e., they cannot observe identities and histories. 
There is no commitment and no enforcement. 
Trade is necessary for consumption to take place. In odd periods, in each 
match a flip of a fair coin determines who is a producer and who is a con- 
sumer. In even periods everyone can produce and consume. Each producer 
can supply a E [0, -a] labor to a technology that transforms it into a goods. He 
suffers disutility a and derives no utility from consumption of own production. 
In odd (even) periods, every consumer has utility u,(c) (ue(c)) from consum- 
ing c > 0 goods. Assume that preferences satisfy the Inada conditions and that 
i E 
(co 
+ 
ce, 
oc), where 
co 
and 
ce 
satisfy u'e(c*) = 
u'o(co) 
= 1. Agents discount 
next period's payoffs by 86 (0, 1) only if the current period is even. 
Consider a match G,(j) in period t. Agents have a nontrivial choice of action 
only as producers, which is when they must choose how much consumption to 
supply to the members of their group. Hence, we identify the action set of any 
agent k e Gt(j) by Ak = [0, a] if k is a producer and Ak = {0} otherwise. We let 
at,k E Ak be an action, so the action space of profiles at,j is At,j = X kEGt(j) Ak The payoff function for agent j is vt,j:At,j -+ IR, where 
Uo(a fu(ct,j) 
- a ,j, if t is odd, uj) Ue(Ct,j) - at,j, if t is even, 
with 
at,k, if j Z k and t is odd, 
0, if j = k and t is odd, 
Ctj lim inf at, , if t is even. n-+oo nf 
kE(i,...,n)\{jl 
Thus, the agent's utility depends on how much output he receives in his match. 
His disutility depends on how much he produces for his partners. Clearly, au- 
tarky, at,k = 0 for all k e G,(j), is the only Nash equilibrium of the static game. 
Indeed, producers cannot be forced, nor can they commit, to provide consump- 
tion. So, producer j can always select a,,j = 0 and enjoy payoff vt,j(at,j) > 0. 
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Now consider the infinite horizon game. For t > 1 let h,,j 
= (ao,j, ... , atj) 
be the history of actions observed by j at 7 < t with ho,j = O. The set of histories t-1 
of j is H,,j 
= X 
0A,,j. 
For G,(j), let h,,j 
= 
(ht,k)kEGt(j) 
and note that partners 
do not have common histories, due to random matching. A pure strategy ao- for 
the infinite horizon game is an infinite sequence of maps o = (so,j, Sl,j, ... ), 
where s,j: H,1j -- Aj is defined by st,j(h,,j) = at,j. The strategy profile in Gt(j) 
is s,(ht,j). Whereas action sets do not depend on histories, let the sequence of 
mappings S,tj = (A''~ 
')=, 
denote the strategy space of agent j in the subgame 
starting at t > 0. Then every o-j gives rise to a strategy oa,, in the subgame at 
t, with o-t,j = (s,j, St+l,j, ...) E St,j and o-0,j = u-. Finally, let a 
= (o-1, o2, ...) be 
the set of strategies of the population J, using cra for a subgame in t. 
Let 5+,1 = 8 if t is even and 1 otherwise. Define the expected period utility 
(1) - [uo(ct,j) - at,j], 
if t is odd, 
(1),- a, if t is even. ue(ct,j) -a,,j,if is ven. 
Whereas each t > 1 defines a proper subgame, we formalize recursively j's pay- 
off in t using the function 
Vt,j: 
X iSt,d, - R defined by 
(2) Vtj,(ot) =- t(st(ht,j)) + 8t+l Vt+,j(ort+,) 
with Vj = Vo0,j. The best response correspondence of agent j is 
p(ar) = o-j 
e So,j: Vj(to-, o-) 
= max 
Vj(cr-, 
x) 
xjESo,j 
so a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the infinite horizon game is a strat- 
egy profile a such that o-j e pj(oa) for all j E J. Clearly, autarky forever is an 
equilibrium because repeated play does not decrease the set of equilibrium 
payoffs. 
What is the efficient allocation in this model? To answer this, consider a plan- 
ner who treats agents identically and faces their physical restrictions. She will 
ask each producer to deliver the surplus-maximizing quantity in each match. 
THEOREM 1: An optimal plan exists and it is unique. Specifically, for all pro- 
ducers k E J we have ao,k = a* = 0 and when t > 1 we have at,k = at = c* if t is 
odd and c* if t is even. 
2. THE MAIN RESULT 
The works by Ellison (1994) and Kandori (1992) suggest that we can sus- 
tain the efficient allocation using a contagion strategy that specifies desirable 
actions as well as sanctions for undesirable actions. We identify desirable be- 
havior with production decisions that conform with the optimal plan and we 
label every other action as undesirable. 
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DEFINITION 2: A strategy o-f = (so,1, sl,, ...) for a producer j E is called a 
contagion strategy if it satisfies so,j = a* and in each period t > 1 we have: 
(i) s,,j(h,,j) = a*, whenever ht,j 
= h;j, and 
(ii) s,j(h,j) = 0 for all r > t, whenever h,,j 
= hj. 
Thus, every producer delivers to his partners ct consumption only if he has 
observed desirable behavior. The producer selects autarky forever as soon as 
he deviates or has knowledge of a deviation. Can the threat of this informal 
punishment sustain the optimal production plan as a subgame perfect equilib- 
rium? 
THEOREM 3: For each 
c* +c* 
6 > 8* c 
o e 
c; ue(C*) + [uo(C) - ] 0 e 2 0 
the contagion strategy supports the optimal plan as a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
Recalling that a monetary authority cannot levy taxes without enforcement, 
we see that the efficient allocation cannot generally be sustained in a monetary 
equilibrium, but is attainable in a nonmonetary equilibrium by patient agents. 
This holds for any J as long as actions are observed without noise (Levine and 
Pesendorfer (1995, p. 1161)). 
To see why, assume that everyone follows the contagion strategy and con- 
sider agent j in t. Strategies and the structure of the game are time-invariant 
in equilibrium, so each subgame is a replica of the infinite horizon game. Thus, 
the equilibrium continuation payoffs in even or odd periods are time-invariant. 
If we denote them by Ve* and Vo*, using (1) and (2), we have 
(3) V*-- 1 Ue(c) 
- 
C 
+ 
[uo(c) 
- c] , 
1 ac Vo* = - -[uo(c*) -  ] +ue(c*) -c* V 1-8 2 c 
For the optimality of o-j consider one-time deviations in a representative 
subgame, in and off equilibrium (unimprovability criterion). Let V/d and Vod be 
the continuation payoffs (in even and odd periods) if a deviation was first seen 
in the prior period, and use Ve and Vo if the deviation was observed earlier. 
Therefore, deviating is suboptimal in t odd if -c* + Ve* > Vd and in t even if 
u(ce) 
- 
ce 
+ 6V* > 
ue(ce) 
+ 8V/d, where time-invariance ofpayoffs is without 
loss in generality becaus  everyone observes a deviation in at most two periods. 
In equilibrium, consider a deviation by a producer in G,(j). If t is odd, 
then in t + 1 all k G,(j) play a*, because ht+1,k = h+l1,. However, all 
agents k E Gt(j) have ht+l,k h+l,k, so they play a,k = 0 in 7 > t + 1. Thus, 
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Jd = Ue(cW) -0 + 81?o for k E G,(j). Whereas G,+1(j) 
= J, everyone observes a
deviation in t + 1, so all k E J have ht+2,k # h2,k and play a,k = 0 in > t + 2. 
Hence, 
V7k 
= 0 for all 
7> 
t + 2 and all k E J, and so o = - V 
= 0. Thus, us- 
ing (3), deviating in t odd is suboptimal if 8 > 8*. For these parameters, defect- 
ing is suboptimal also if t is even, which is when a defection is immediately seen 
by all k E J and so Vd = 
I 
= 0 . Finally, off equilibrium, choosing autarky after 
observing a deviation is clearly in a producer's best interest. Everyone learns 
of a deviation with at most one period delay, so permanent autarky cannot be 
avoided by forgiving (producing for) a deviator. 
In sum, efficient trades are sustainable without money because any devia- 
tion shuts down trade very fast. Pairwise random trade slows the transfer of 
information, but cannot prevent it simply because agents are anonymous. Ob- 
servability of actions and centralized trade allow informational f ows that en- 
courage desirable behavior in every match. In our working paper (Aliprantis, 
Camera, and Puzzello (2005)), we develop a matching model that is immune 
to contagion and present environments where money is essential to support 
trade in large markets populated by complete strangers. Another approach is 
Shi (1997). 
Dept. of Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47907-2056, U.S.A.; 
aliprantis @mgmt.purdue.edu, 
Dept. of Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47907-2056, U.S.A.; 
gcamera @mgmt.purdue.edu, 
and 
Dept. of Economics and Mathematics, University ofKentucky, Lexington, 
KY 40506-0034, U.S.A.; Daniela.Puzzello@uky.edu. 
Manuscript received October 2005; final revision received March, 2006. 
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